

# Improve RCV with Condorcet Minimax

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Compared with plurality voting, ranked-choice voting (RCV) can potentially result in the election of candidates more representative of voter preferences. However, the usual successive elimination procedure for determining the winning candidate is a poor method for processing ranked-choice ballots. I have prepared, in easy-to-read outline form, an explanation of the flaws of the successive elimination method, results of an actual election demonstrating these flaws, and a proposal for improving RCV by using the method best supported by academic research.

## ❖ Typical Ranked-Choice Voting (RCV) Election:

- **Voters rank candidates in order of preference.**
  - Ballots can be spoiled by tied or skipped rankings.
  - Voters are unlikely to rank more than three or four candidates.
- **Successive elimination (default for “RCV” or “instant runoff voting (IRV)”):**
  - Starting with voters’ 1<sup>st</sup> choices, candidates with the fewest votes are eliminated in rounds. This requires information from all ballots to be on hand before the vote tabulation process can begin. Long delays are common.
  - Ballots supporting eliminated candidates have the next choice counted as 1<sup>st</sup> in the next round if and only if that choice has not been eliminated. This requires all ballot preferences to be stored at the vote tabulation location.
  - Lacks transparency: hand audits and recounts are extremely cumbersome since ballots need to be accessed multiple times.
- **When only two candidates remain, the winner is the one with the most votes in that round.**
  - Ballots supporting the final eliminated candidate do not have the next choice counted. Thus, ballots are not all treated equally.
- **This method often yields unsatisfactory outcomes:**
  - “Vote splitting” can eliminate a candidate who would have won if a “spoiler” candidate were eliminated sooner.
  - A majority of voters may prefer one of the losing candidates to the winning candidate.

## ❖ Example: Alaska 2022 Special House Election

- **Top vote recipients in the open primary were:**
  - Sarah Palin (R) 27.0%
  - Nick Begich (R) 19.1%
  - Al Gross (I) 12.6%
  - Mary Peltola (D) 10.1%
- **Palin and Peltola would presumably have won closed party primaries.**
- **Al Gross dropped out of the race.**

### ➤ **General Election Ballot Ranking Distribution**

% of Ballots →	14.3%	8.2%	6.0%	18.1%	1.9%	11.3%	25.1%	2.5%	12.6%
1st choice →	Begich	Begich	Begich	Palin	Palin	Palin	Peltola	Peltola	Peltola
2nd choice →	Palin	Peltola	–	Begich	Peltola	–	Begich	Palin	–

### ➤ **Successive Elimination Rounds:**

- Results were announced 15 days after the August 16<sup>th</sup> election.

	Begich	Palin	Peltola	Total	Notes
<b>Round 1</b>	28.5%	31.3%	40.2%	100.0%	Begich eliminated
<b>Round 2</b>	N/A	45.6%	48.4%	94.0%	Peltola wins

- Begich is eliminated in Round 1. Voters who selected Begich first have their second choices counted.
  - Palin is eliminated in Round 2. Voters who selected Palin first do not have their second choices counted.
  - Peltola wins with a relative majority of votes versus Palin (not an absolute majority).
- ### ➤ **Final Result**
- 42.1% of voters expressed a preference for Peltola over Begich.  
(1.9% + 25.1% + 2.5% + 12.6%)
  - 46.6% of voters expressed a preference for Begich over Peltola.  
(14.3% + 8.2% + 6% + 18.1%)
  - **A relative majority of voters prefers a losing candidate (Begich) to the winner (Peltola). This is a poor election result.**
  - “Vote splitting” between Begich and Palin caused Begich to be prematurely eliminated. Palin is a “spoiler” candidate.
  - The Republican National Committee adopted a [Resolution to Officially Oppose Ranked Choice Voting Across the Country](#).

## ❖ Improving RCV with Condorcet Minimax:

- **Voters rank candidates in order of preference.**
  - Ballots should not be spoiled by tied or skipped rankings.
  - Limit the number of general election candidates by advancing three to five candidates from an inclusive single-ballot primary election.
- **For each pair of candidates, determine who is ranked higher on each ballot.**
  - Ignore tied rankings. Count unranked candidates as ranked worst.
  - Each precinct keeps running totals as ballots are processed.
  - Summarize all ballot information in a list of pairwise results or as a table of the number of voters preferring each candidate to each opponent.
  - Ballot tabulation is fast and transparent.
- **Determine the winning candidate using the Condorcet Minimax (or Simpson–Kramer) method:**
  - If one candidate is preferred to each opponent by a relative majority of voters (as is true in nearly all elections), then that candidate is elected.
  - Otherwise, elect the candidate requiring the fewest additional 1<sup>st</sup>-choice rankings to attain relative majority preference over each opponent.
  - Compared with other election methods, Condorcet Minimax minimizes voter preference for the runner-up relative to the winner.
  - Alternative methods such as Approval or STAR voting incentivize voters to “bullet vote” for a single candidate, thereby reducing the influence of voters who indicate support for multiple candidates.

**Election Result Table for AK 2022 Special House Election  
(% of Voters Preferring Candidate to Opponent)**

		<u>Opponents:</u>	<u>Begich</u>	<u>Palin</u>	<u>Peltola</u>
Candidates:	Begich		-----	53.7%	46.6%
	Palin		33.7%	-----	45.6%
	Peltola		42.1%	48.4%	-----

**Pairwise election results:**

- Begich 53.7% versus Palin 33.7%
- Begich 46.6% versus Peltola 42.1%
- Peltola 48.4% versus Palin 45.6%

**Begich should be elected as the “Condorcet winner” preferred by voters to each of the other candidates.**

## ❖ Summary

### ➤ **RCV with Successive Elimination:**

- Voids ballots with tied rankings.
- Requires all ballot information to be accessible at a central tabulation center.
- Requires all ballots to be processed before beginning tabulation.
- Counts second choices for some ballots but not others, depending on when the first choice is eliminated.
- Hand audits and recounts are difficult.
- Subject to vote-splitting and “spoiler” candidates.
- A losing candidate is often preferred by voters to the winning candidate.

### ➤ **Condorcet Minimax:**

- Allows ballots with tied rankings.
- Allows ballot data to be compiled at each precinct.
- Allows immediate tabulation of ballots as they are processed.
- Counts all rankings on all ballots. No voter preferences are lost.
- Easy to perform hand audits or recounts.
- Pairwise comparisons not affected by other candidate rankings.
- Guarantees election of any candidate who is preferred by voters to each opponent (i.e. any candidate who would defeat each opponent head-to-head).
- Minimizes the likelihood of voters preferring a losing candidate to the winning candidate.
- Supported by rigorous academic research.

### **Notes:**

Academics at Princeton University explain the advantages of Condorcet methods:

<https://www.princeton.edu/~cuff/voting/theory.html>,

[https://www.princeton.edu/~cuff/publications/wang\\_allerton\\_2012.pdf](https://www.princeton.edu/~cuff/publications/wang_allerton_2012.pdf)

Richard Darlington of Cornell University has performed simulations demonstrating the superiority of Condorcet Minimax methods over other election methods:

<https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04371>, <https://arxiv.org/pdf/1807.01366>,

<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-022-09390-w>

(Other academic research supporting Condorcet Minimax is cited in these papers.)

Andrew Meyers of Cornell University developed the [Condorcet Internet Voting Service](#), for which a version of Minimax is the default method for reasons explained here:

<https://civs1.civs.us/rp.html>