We, the elected District Attorneys of Deschutes, Multnomah and Wasco Counties, wish to offer this testimony in regard to House Bill 2002. Our criminal justice system is in need of comprehensive reform. HB 2002 is an ambitious proposal rooted in a deeply meaningful dialogue with the communities most impacted by that system. While we do have concerns with some aspects of the bill as written and are unable to support it fully at this time, we look forward to working with the proponents to work to resolve these concerns. We recognize that HB 2002 was produced as the result of a Black, Indigenous and People of Color-led, community driven process, and share the desire to elevate and center these voices in this discussion. Overwhelming data has established that BIPOC communities are overrepresented at every level of our criminal justice system, from policing to arrest to prosecution to sentencing. It is essential that the communities that are the most impacted by our criminal justice system be given the space and voice to lead us in reforming that system.

We are also moved to submit this testimony due to our shared alarm over representations recently made by the Oregon District Attorneys Association (ODAA), in which we are each full members, in a recent memorandum regarding the effect and history of Ballot Measure 11 (BM11).¹ We urge legislators to approach this memorandum with caution. ODAA asserts that BM 11 is causally responsible for the overall drop in crime rates in Oregon following its passage in 1994. The data does not support this conclusion. While crime did drop in Oregon after its historic peak several years prior to the passage of BM11, this trend was generally true across the country. Crime dropped in states which adopted

¹ https://washcoda.s3-us-west-2.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/FINAL_ODAAStatement.pdf?MhvoQlydZYgcqm6EHV7LIW_RdVbX3z and https://f089a6f3-e440-4f12-9600-0d9903293503.filesusr.com/ugd/818f22_93baf9ce1d8d4f1b94f0303c14bab6d2.pdf
mandatory minimum structures similar to Oregon’s and in those which did not. A Harvard study noted a 58% drop in serious crime in New York City between 1994 and 2014 at the same time the combined jail and prison population was cut by 55%.\(^2\) When California reduced its prison population by 25%, reports of violent crime dropped by 21% during the same period.\(^3\) When New Jersey reduced its prison population by 25%, reports of violent crime dropped by 31%.\(^4\) A comprehensive report by the National Academy of Sciences issued in 2014 concluded that on balance, higher incarceration rates had at best a “modest” impact on these declining crime rates.\(^5\) A 2017 study by Portland State University focusing on a wide range of Oregon criminal cases found no correlation between the length of sentence imposed and the likelihood that a person would reoffend.\(^6\) These are a small sampling of the many studies which have called into suspicion the correlation between mandatory minimum sentencing regimes like BM 11 and a lower crime rate or lower rate of recidivism among those sentenced. We simply cannot endorse the assertion made by ODAA that BM11 itself somehow “caused” a decline in crime that occurred simultaneously in almost every corner of the country.

BM 11 did, however, come at significant cost. BM 11 has deepened disparities in our criminal justice system, led to a ballooning of prison costs, and has given the right to determine the sentence in our most serious crimes over from judges to unfettered prosecutorial discretion. In a system of criminal justice where over 90% of cases are resolved via plea offer rather than trial, the incredible leverage provided by BM 11 provides prosecutors – and prosecutors alone – the ability to decide the sentence by voluntarily declining to pursue a BM 11 charge, often by electing to reduce a charge to a lesser offense or an “attempt.”

A 2011 study by Oregon’s Criminal Justice Commission noted that over 70% of those indicted in Oregon for committing a BM 11 offense will ultimately be sentenced to a lesser crime at the sole discretion of

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the prosecutor’s plea bargain.\(^7\) This same report notes that a defendant who takes a BM 11 charge to trial is four times as likely to receive a full-length BM 11 sentence. This suggests that a person who refuses to accept a prosecutor’s plea offer is extremely likely to be punished for this decision at trial, creating a very strong incentive to plea. Contrary to representations that BM 11 has created “truth in sentencing,” the primary effect has been to provide prosecutors with leverage. A judge is powerless to modify that sentence – no matter the mitigation, no matter the prospects of rehabilitation, and no matter the wishes of the victim.

Nor has the effect fallen evenly on all communities. The overrepresentation of people of color at every phase of the criminal justice system guarantees that mandatory minimums will fall most heavily on our diverse populations. ODAA’s assertion that allowing judges to determine sentences will somehow increase disparity relies on the dubious assumption that the prosecutor driven system of plea bargaining is somehow less prone to bias than the actions of a judge in open court. We believe that judges are uniquely well positioned to impose a fair sentence, based on an official record made in open court and within a system where both sides get to make their case. ODAA’s own polling suggests that a majority of Oregonians would like to see judges, not prosecutors, determine sentences for even our most violent offenders. As elected District Attorneys, we agree.

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