



**OREGON
DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT**

**STATE RECOVERY FUNCTION
AFTER-ACTION REPORT**



Produced by: AC Disaster Consulting

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Administrative Handling:

Nomenclature: The title of this document is "Oregon Office of Emergency Management State Recovery Functions After-Action Report."

Distribution: Limited distribution to partner agencies and members of the Oregon OEM SRFs. Additional distribution must be coordinated with:

Stanton Thomas | stan.thomas@oem.oregon.gov
Division Director for Mitigation and Recovery
Oregon Department of Emergency Management

Shawna Jepson | shawna.jepson@oem.oregon.gov
Interagency Strategic Recovery Manager
Oregon Department of Emergency Management

INTRODUCTION

The Incident

In 2020, the State of Oregon endured the most destructive wildfire season on record. Wildfires began in August 2020 with containment not being achieved until November 2020. The wildfires spread throughout the entire State, burning over 900,000 acres, affecting twenty counties, and destroying or damaging over 5,000 structures. The 2020 wildfires severely impacted small and rural communities and caused crippling economic impacts with over \$600 million in damages across the State.

FEMA declared a major disaster declaration on September 15th, 2020 for the incident period of September 7th, 2020 through November 3rd, 2020. This declaration, named Oregon Wildfires and Straight-line Winds, included the major fires that began in September, not including those fires that began in August 2020. Prior to this incident, between February 2019 and February 2020, the State had three major disaster declarations (severe winter storms, flooding, and COVID-19) and another major disaster declaration six months after the wildfires in February 2021. In addition, 20 Fire Management Assistance declarations were made throughout the state for the period 2019-2021. See appendix 1. The multitude of consecutive disasters required the Oregon Department of Emergency Management (OEM) to activate at various levels with the largest activation occurring for the 2020 wildfire response and recovery efforts. Response activations have been ongoing since September 2020, transitioning from short-term, intermediate, and finally into long-term recovery efforts.

The Background

The Governor of Oregon has delegated authority to OEM to coordinate and facilitate emergency response and recovery operations and activities. The framework for these operations in the State are outlined in Oregon's Disaster Recovery Plan and the Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, which provide the groundwork for preparedness, response, and recovery activities. OEM has been engaged in response and recovery efforts alongside many State and local agencies which will continue for years to come.. The efforts undertaken by OEM and its partners have been instrumental in the recovery for the State which has required coordination at all levels. This After-Action Report (AAR) will serve as an assessment of the State Recovery Functions' (SRF) abilities to sufficiently activate and perform their roles and responsibilities as outlined in the Disaster Recovery Plan.

INTRODUCTION

CONTINUED

OEM engaged in the development of this After-Action Report (AAR) in January 2022 to assess recovery efforts from the 2020 Wildfires. The scope of this AAR includes recovery events between September 2020 and September 2021, focusing on the coordination efforts across all seven State Recovery Functions and with local, State, Tribal, and Federal agencies.

The scope and goal of this AAR is two-fold: Assess the coordination efforts by and between the SRF Lead's and execution of their objectives following the immediate response efforts and to determine how well the *State Disaster Recovery Plan (SDRP)* provided sufficient guidance to execute their objectives in the recovery efforts.

This assessment is an abridged analysis and is focused solely on SRF Leadership, the State

Disaster Recovery Coordinator (SDRC) and each SRF Lead's ability to successfully execute their role in coordination of response and recovery activities. The After-Action Report scope was completed over a one-month period.

The SRFs are activated for the intermediate phase of response and recovery following the initial short-term activation of the Emergency Response Functions. SRF's are expected to function in a state of readiness, participating in planning and preparedness activities, and an activated state during response and recovery efforts. The activation of the SRFs is to facilitate and accelerate communication, encourage whole community coordination, and deliver resources to communities impacted.



OVERVIEW

Incident Overview

Incident	DR 4562 Oregon 2020 Wildfires and Straight-Line Winds
Incident Dates	September 7th, 2020 – November 3rd, 2020
Mission Area	Recovery
Threat or Hazard	Wildfires and Straight-Line Winds
FEMA Core Capabilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Planning • Public Information & Warning • Operational Coordination, Economic Recovery • Health and Social Services • Housing • Natural and Cultural Resources
Incident Objectives	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Life Safety • Housing • Health and Social Services • Infrastructure • Economic Recovery • Natural and Cultural Resources • Community Recovery
Incident Goal	Focus on rebuilding impacted communities, individuals and families, critical infrastructure, and essential government or commercial services.
SRF Coordinating Agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Oregon Military Department of Emergency Management (OEM) • SRF 1 - Oregon Dept. of Land Conservation and Development • SRF 2 - Business Oregon • SRF 3 - Oregon Health Authority • SRF 4 - Oregon Dept. of Human Services • SRF 5 - Oregon Housing and Community Services • SRF 6 - Oregon Dept. of Administrative Services, Oregon Dept. of Energy, Oregon Dept. of Transportation, Public Utility Commission of Oregon • SRF 7 - Oregon Dept. of Environmental Quality

METHODOLOGY

In order to assess recovery efforts from the 2020 Wildfires, SRF Leads participated in a kick-off workshop to discuss the overarching objectives of the AAR and coordinate activities for development of the report. Following the kick-off workshop, each SRF Lead was asked to participate in one-on-one interviews to allow for a more focused discussion on their activation as SRF Lead and to determine their assessment on the success of said activation.

Key findings for success and improvement within each of these objectives were gathered throughout the workshops while also identifying gaps in the SDRP. Special attention was paid to whether the SDRP was helpful during the activation of each SRF and where improvements could be made when updating the plan.

Participants of the engagement activities were limited to individuals who were identified as leaders of their respective SRF or task force. This was essential for identifying the successful and challenging aspects of activation and coordination between the SRFs, rather than the details of each SRF's internal dynamics and technical work. Therefore, Key Findings reflect areas of improvement that are consistent with all SRFs based on the workshops. A detailed analysis based on SRFs as they pertain to the Incident Objectives will be performed by OEM separately. The primary engagement activity used to gain insight and feedback was one-on-one interviews. This provided a high level, yet detailed, understanding of each SRF through the leader's experience of beginning recovery efforts. It also gave insight to how SRF collaboration impacted their work and overall situational awareness.

Each SRF leader's experience is unique because of differences in departments, emergency management experience and available resources, as well as other factors. Conducting mostly one-on-one interviews illuminated what aspects of each leader's experience can be attributed to individual factors and what experiences could be supported or changed through OEM recovery plans.

KEY FINDINGS

Key Findings for each objective were gathered and coupled with recommendations to improve the *State Disaster Recovery Plan (SDRP)* and the processes for activation of the SRFs. It is important to note this AAR did not complete an in-depth analysis for how each individual SRF functioned, whether or not objectives were met, and whether activation and mission function was successful. This AAR was limited to SRF Leadership and focused on findings that consistently overarched all the SRFs. It is strongly recommended OEM engage in additional AARs for each SRF to assess successes and identify detailed areas of improvement needed within each Incident Objective.

Areas of Success

While the focus of this AAR is to identify areas of improvement and to provide recommendations for SDRP updates, areas of success were noted throughout the workshops. These Areas of Success can be leveraged by OEM to improve response/recovery processes and ensure successful activation in future incidents.

AREAS OF SUCCESS

1. OEM was praised for their leadership throughout the activation with SRF leads consistently agreeing, without the leadership that was in place, the activation would have failed.
2. SRF leads felt empowered by OEM to make decisions based on the need of their partners.
3. OEM and the leads quickly adapted to the changing landscape of their response activities and were able to navigate the challenge presented with this support from leadership.
4. SRF leads felt that collaboration with their SRF Counterparts and OEM worked well through regular meetings, constant communication and pre-established relationships.

KEY FINDINGS

Areas of Improvement

The areas of improvement for each objective are detailed below followed with recommendations, actionable steps to implement recommendations, and suggested timeline to complete each step.

State Disaster Recovery Plan

The *State Disaster Recovery Plan (SDRP)* was adopted in March 2018 to serve as the guiding document for State-level recovery activities aligning with FEMA's National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) considering the Robert T. Stafford Act and other applicable federal regulations. The *SDRP* establishes the State Recovery Functions (SRF) and their role in guiding response and recovery following the federal framework for Recovery Support Functions (RSF). Using the federal framework as a guide, the *SDRP* establishes within each SRF the State agency responsible for coordinating recovery efforts, defines roles and responsibilities, identifies primary and supporting agencies, and sets clear goals and objectives.

Special attention was paid to the role the *SDRP* played during the initial activation of the SRFs and whether or not the Plan assisted the SRFs with meeting their objectives. One commonality between all of the SRF leads was that the plan did not provide enough operational guidance or details within each SRF annex to effectively guide the activation. While it was noted in engagement activities that the plan was helpful in introducing recovery to leaders with no experience in emergency management, the plan was either not used or was deemed ineffective due to the lack of specificity in the plan to implement response and recovery efforts. These inefficacies were exacerbated by the unprecedented size of the response and recovery efforts for the wildfires. One leader explained that "once we found it and knew [the *SDRP*] existed, I think it helped to set context, but it doesn't tell you how to do anything."

While the plan provides the basic framework for response and recovery efforts, the plan lacks specificity in many key areas that would help guide response and recovery efforts and to assist with meeting SRF objectives. Outlined below are five core areas within the plan that need additional details and processes put in place.

KEY FINDINGS

CONTINUED

- The plan is too vague and does not provide the depth and details needed to provide comprehensive guidance.
- Transition plan needs to be built out to aid the transition from Emergency Support Functions (ESF) to SRF.
- Roles and Responsibilities within each SRF need to be further defined.
- Partnerships established pre-disaster and outlined in the plan with roles and responsibilities defined.
- Develop structured exercise and training programs.
- Align language and definitions with other plans that precede the SDRP.

Activation and Coordination

OEM's engagement in the activation and coordination of the SRFs initially started as a coordinating agency, however, OEM's role transitioned to a tasking agency in the following months as recovery continued. OEMs coordination efforts began with activating the SRFs during the intermediate phase of recovery. This activation occurs while the State's Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are activated for the immediate, short-term recovery efforts and starts almost immediately after a disaster and can last indefinitely. The SDRP tasks the State Coordinating Officer (SCO) and the State Disaster Recovery Coordinator (SDRC) with managing the transition from ESF to SRF (short-term to intermediate recovery). During the course of the workshops, each participant discussed the events that led up to activation and the coordination that took place during the initial activation, and the role the plan played in their ability to activate successfully. Many participants noted that the transition period was confusing and cumbersome stating that roles were unclear, knowing where ESF responsibilities ended and SRF responsibilities were unclear, and knowing when total deactivation of the ESF was to occur was also unclear.

Throughout the workshops, the participants frequently noted they were unfamiliar with the plan, its purpose, and how the plan should be applied to their activation. Additionally, many participants stated that not only were they not familiar with the plan, but they also did not have direct experience with an emergency response incident of this scale. The disaster recovery plan serves as the guiding document during SRF activation and with a general lack of familiarity with the plan, ensuring effective implementation of the plan was at a deficit from initial activation.

KEY FINDINGS

CONTINUED

The plan calls for SRFs to be always in a state of readiness or activation which requires leads and support staff to maintain ongoing familiarity of the document through continual planning efforts and completing trainings and exercises. Discussions during the workshops made clear that these efforts were not occurring regularly or not occurring at all. Establishing a structured training and exercise plan will mitigate the lack of emergency response and recovery experience across multiple incident scales and types. The nature of emergency management is inherently inconsistent and effective management of response and recovery activities cannot be done without regularly exercising the plans and updating the plans as needed.

While some leads did not have the experience necessary, it was noted some of the SRF leads and support staff, did have the experience to warrant their placement on the SRF team and had an easier time navigating the response and recovery efforts. This experience, -while limited- helped with the overall coordination efforts which were frequently described as successful by SRF leads. Participants asserted that initiatives were further supported by experienced personnel being able to lean on existing relationships and connections to execute their role effectively. Nevertheless, relationships alone could not ensure sustainable efficacy through the activation. Unclear roles and responsibilities complicated efforts despite experience and connections. Because the SRFs relied on supporting agencies to assist with meeting objectives, ensuring these partnerships are established prior to activation is paramount. Key findings/areas of improvement under Activation and Coordination were identified as follows:

- Transition from ESF to RSF was unclear.
- Lack of familiarity with the *SDRP* and unprecedented scale of incident.
- Lack of implementation of training and exercising the *SDRP*.

KEY FINDINGS

CONTINUED

Resources

Each SRF is comprised of coordinating agencies, primary agencies, and supporting agencies which are defined in the SDRP. These agencies serve various roles with the coordinating agency being responsible for the overall coordination, ensuring continuity of operations, resource distribution, and orchestrating activities during times of activation. Primary agencies will have statutory authority and/or programs pre-established to support the SRFs and are responsible for performing ongoing maintenance of the SRFs capabilities. Supporting agencies are identified to assist the coordinating and primary agencies during activation and serve specialized roles.

All agencies, regardless of role, should be identified prior to activations to ensure resources are available as needed. During the workshops, participants frequently mentioned resources and support needed to assist with the activation and the many different agencies that were involved with the SRFs during activation.

Proper levels of staffing for response and recovery activities arose from the workshops as theme. Participants frequently expressed lacking the bandwidth and additional resources to support their duties. All workshop participants noted that they were required to maintain both their regular, fulltime jobs while serving as SRF lead. This dual responsibility did not allow staff to properly engage and focus on their duties as SRF lead. While emergency management is among many industries facing employment shortages and budget cuts, the attention and focus needed to effectively manage response and recovery necessitates realignment of priorities and directing additional funding to properly staff the Primary and Coordinating agencies. These issues can further be mitigated by ensuring staff are trained and engaged frequently as stated above.

Primary and Supporting Agencies that were involved in the activation were often unaware of the SRFs role, and their role within the SRF and did not properly engage the SRFs when activating during the response and recovery effort. This confusion with roles and responsibilities and inadequate resources led to general lack of organization and an inability for the leads to know who should be involved. The SDRP lacks a defined organizational structure within each SRF. This is needed to provide a framework for identifying necessary resources during the readiness and activated states.

KEY FINDINGS

CONTINUED

This structure should be tailored to meet the needs of each SRF and reflective of the duties assigned. In addition to properly staffing each SRF, subject matter experts in fields such as procurement and federal grants should be added to the organizational structure as support staff.

- Insufficient Resources
- Due to the plan not being previously exercised, there was a lack of familiarity, understanding, and awareness of organizational structure.

Internal and External Collaboration

Collaboration with supporting agencies, partnerships, and stakeholders is paramount to the success of the SRFs meeting their objectives during response and recovery activities. Collaboration between the SRFs, between the SRFs and their supporting agencies, SRFs and other state and federal agencies, and SRFs and local and tribal agencies, occurs instantaneously and can quickly become an area of conflict. Constant and consistent communication breeds strong relationships that enables effective collaboration throughout readiness and activated states.

It was noted collaboration was hindered due to pre-established relationships not being formed. Developing and sustaining relationships to maintain effective collaboration during response and recovery activities is of utmost importance. A few workshop participants also noted that often times, the agencies the SRFs were supporting and working with were unfamiliar with not only the staff member they were also unfamiliar SRF and their role. This further complicated the response and recovery activities and the ability for the SRF to carry out their duties effectively.

- Lack of pre-established relationships with partners led to confusion.
- Unclear roles and responsibilities within each SRF and across the SRFs led to misunderstanding and conflict

COVID-19 Impacts

As mentioned above, the collaboration with supporting agencies, partnerships and stakeholders is a key aspect of ensuring successful delivery of SRF objectives. The unprecedented nature of the pandemic has highlighted the importance of building relationships through frequent communication and engagement opportunities as well as ensuring that plans include operational guidance for operating in a virtual world.

KEY FINDINGS

CONTINUED

COVID-19 restrictions convoluted navigating the transition from ESF to SRF, hampered the engagement of all SRF leads, and complicated reaching objectives. Meetings were held virtually, field work was stalled, and providing onsite support to local and tribal agencies was limited exacerbating bandwidth issues and barriers to building effective relationships.

- Considerations for operating in a virtual world were not considered when the plan was developed

Equity

Viewing response and recovery efforts through the equity lens provides insight into communities and their varying needs. Each community impacted by a disaster will require different resources to recover and having clear insight and understanding into the needs will help meet equity goals. Establishing clear equity goals at the State level and dedicating resources to assist communities to meet these goals will encourage the continued prioritization of equity goals.

During response and recovery, equity often times unintentionally becomes a secondary consideration and, as one participant noted, “Equity responsibilities were pushed to local governments because they were familiar with their community needs.” Allowing local governments to ensure equity is maintained within their community during disasters allows for a targeted effort but, the State should establish equity goals at the State level during response and recovery operations. The Plan itself does not establish equity goals or provide objectives to maintain equity throughout the impacted communities. OEM has stated that they did not have the full capabilities to manage this aspect of emergency management and utilized federal assistance to bring in an equity officer to assist with these efforts.

Many workshop participants identified the need for pre-established relationships and knowledge to ensure equity remains a focus and priority. Another obstacle the participants faced was being unaware of tasks to complete to ensure equity was being considered and being unable to track resource allocations which made it difficult to identify gaps.

KEY FINDINGS

CONTINUED

Furthermore, federal funding for disasters is not distributed equally and those communities that are not eligible to receive federal funding are unintentionally de-prioritized. Focus tends to follow the funding in declared areas which highlights the need for funding at the State level to be a priority. Federal funding does not tailor itself to meet the needs of specific communities, whereas with the development of a State-driven and State-funded Individual and Public Assistance grant program, with the ability to ensure the needs of all communities are considered, allows for equitable distribution of funding and the financial means necessary to support all communities.

- Equity was not prioritized.
- Inability to identify where gaps in equity exist.
- Inequitable distribution of Federal Disaster funding.

Long-Term Goals

At the conclusion of the workshops, the participants were asked what long-term goals they had for their SRF and what they need to meet those goals. These goals and needs were similar across the SRFs and roadblocks for meeting these goals are echoed in the key findings and recommendations for improvement mentioned below. Each lead was enthusiastic about the future of their roles in response and recovery efforts and as SRF Lead. Recognition of the efforts put forth by all staff engaged was highlighted through the workshops.

Additionally, the workshops highlighted a gap in available resources (staffing, funding, training, exercises) and the resources needed to successfully activate during responses. This gap is, in large part, due to inadequate funding available to support additional resources at the local and state level. The State has been a recipient of federal and state funding following declared disasters but, generally speaking, the funding made available to the State is tied to disasters. This disaster-oriented distribution of funds inhibits the ability to allocate resource for additional resources and activities because of the strict parameters. Recognizing the lack of flexibility with funds tied to disasters, the State could consider proposing a State Disaster Recovery fund that would allow the State to be more flexible and expeditious in supporting a range of resources and activities with fewer regulations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Incident Objective	Finding	Recommendation	Action Item	Implementation Timeline
Post-Disaster After-Action Review	Completion of an assessment of the SRFs and their functionality.	Complete AARs on each SRF and with the Local Jurisdictions that had FEMA PA and IA declarations to determine success and where improvements should be made.	6 months	6 months
State Disaster Recovery Plan	The plan is too vague and does not provide the depth and details needed to provide comprehensive guidance.	<p>Incorporate recommended changes outlined in this report to include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop transition plan to assist with the period of overlap while Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) are demobilizing and SRFs are activating. • Define further the roles and responsibilities within each SRF. • Establish partnerships pre-disaster and outline in the plan defined roles and responsibilities. • Develop structured exercise and training programs. • Align language and definitions with other plans that precede the SDRP. 	Plan Update	6 months
Activation and Coordination	Lack of Familiarity with State Disaster Recovery plan and Unprecedented Scale of Incident.	Developing a detailed state of readiness plan outlining the requirements for plan maintenance and training requirements will establish a knowledge base throughout each SRF and provide the institutional knowledge needed to effectively manage SRF responsibilities.	Plan Update	6 months
		Ensure SRFs are meeting their objectives of providing technical assistance and support for mitigation and resilience efforts with frequent engagement with local agencies through workshops, local plan review, and exercises.	Community Engagement	

RECOMMENDATIONS

Incident Objective	Finding	Recommendation	Action Item	Implementation Timeline
Activation and Coordination	Transition from ESF to RSF Unclear.	Develop transition plan to assist with the period of overlap while ESFs are demobilizing and SRFs are activating.	Plan Update	6 months
	Lack of Implementation of Training and Exercising the Plan.	Develop structured exercise and training plan for all SRFs and require participation from supporting agencies in training, exercises, and plan reviews/updates.	Community Engagement	3-6 months
Resources	Insufficient Resources.	Identify funding available to allow for additional staffing resources to be allocated to the SRF.	Interagency Coordination	3-6 months
	Lack of Organizational Structure, unclear roles and responsibilities.	Develop organizational structure that will assist supporting agencies during the initial activation in understanding their roles and responsibilities.	Plan Update	6 months
Internal and External Collaboration	Lack of pre-established relationships with partners.	Establish and build relationships with partners early in the planning process and engaging all relevant parties in training and exercises will grow familiarity with staff who will be working on the response activities.	Community Engagement	3-6 months
	Unclear Roles and Responsibilities.	Define roles and responsibilities for all internal and external partners involved in the collaboration during SRF activation.	Plan Update	6 months

RECOMMENDATIONS

Incident Objective	Finding	Recommendation	Action Item	Implementation Timeline
COVID-19 Impacts	Considerations for operating in a virtual world were omitted from the plan.	Conducting a thorough review of all plans to ensure inclusion of considerations for activating in a virtual world as well as training and exercises to include how to activate in a virtual world. These reviews should be coupled with an assessment of connectivity capabilities for all state, local, and tribal agencies as well as primary agencies.	Plan Update	6 months
Equity	Equity was de-prioritized.	Work with partners to define equity goals at the local level prior to a disaster and incorporate into each SRF annex.	Interagency Coordination	3-6 months
	Inability to identify where gaps in equity exist.	Develop equity goals to incorporate into the Plan. Develop a checklist of tasks to meet equity goals. Develop system for tracking resource allocations.	Plan Update	6 months
	Inequitable distribution of federal disaster funding.	Establish State Disaster Recovery Fund to ensure that funding is available to all impacted areas, not just the areas that have federally declared disasters.	Interagency Coordination	3-6 months
Long-Term Goals	Inadequate funding to meet goals and objectives of each SRF	Identify method to establish a State Disaster Recovery Fund that will provide the fiscal means for each SRF to address gaps in their capabilities.	Interagency Coordination	3-6 months

CONCLUSION

Workshops with SRF Leads identified overlapping areas for improvement that largely included needed updates to the State Disaster Recovery Plan to provide clarity for staff regarding roles and responsibilities, activation and coordination, and implementation of the plan to include training exercises and better prepare SRF staff during response/recovery activation.

In addition to areas of improvement within the overall State Disaster Recovery Plan, workshops identified the need for OEM to scale resources relevant to the scale of the disaster. This area of improvement was identified not only due to the unprecedented scale of DR 4562, but also due to consecutive disasters experienced in Oregon due to COVID-19. It is recommended that as OEM considers how to address resources for future response activities, that the state consider multiple incident scales and the potential for increased likelihood of consecutive disaster response and recovery scenarios.

Finally, SRF Leads identified the need for greater equity across recovery efforts and the need to bridge gaps in funding to ensure recovery is equitable.

In order to address the key findings in this report, SRF Leads identified Areas of Success which can be leveraged to ensure Long-Term Goals are achieved. Overall, workshops identified Areas of Success to include an environment fostered by OEM that promoted adaptation and flexibility which enabled each SRF to successfully execute their function and mission assignments. In addition, workshops identified OEM leadership as an Area of Success for ongoing support to SRF Leads and for effectively managing the needs of response and early recovery efforts.

CONCLUSION

CONTINUED

This AAR report provides significant insight into the general functionality of the State Disaster Recovery Plan as it is currently written. Adapting the plan to address the current environmental and developing a robust organizational structure will provide a solid foundation and framework for building supplementary annexes. As previously described, this report focused on the SRF leads and their ability to activate effectively using the SDRP but did not analyze the functionality within each SRF. It is highly recommended that OEM conduct subsequent AARs for each SRF to determine additional improvements needed for each annex in addition to the improvements noted here. To ensure future response activations are successful, creating a plan that is comprehensible, detailed, and provides a strong organizational framework will ensure effective response and recovery efforts are achieved.



APPENDIX

Declaration Type	Name	Dates
Major Disaster Declaration	Severe Winter Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	04/06/2019-04/21/2019
	COVID-19 Pandemic	01/20/2020-ongoing
	Severe Storms, Flooding, Landslides, and Mudslides	02/05/2020-02/09/2020
	Wildfire and Straight-line Winds	09/07/2020-11/03/2020
	Winter Storms	02/11/2021-02/15/2021
Fire Management Assistance	Mile Post 97 Fire	7/27/2019-ongoing
	Mosier Creek Fire	08/12/2020-08/19/2020
	White River Fire	08/17/2020-09/10/2020
	Two Four Two	09/07/2020-09/23/2020
	Holiday Farm Fire	09/08/2020-ongoing
	Powerline Fire	09/08/2020-09/14/2020
	Beachie Creek Lionshead Complex	09/07/2020-10/15/2020
	Archie Creek Fire	09/08/2020-10/15/2020
	Riverside	09/08/2020-10/15/2020
	South Obenchain	09/08/2020-ongoing
	Echo Mountain	09/08/2020-09/22/2020
	Almeda Glendower	09/08/2020-09/15/2020
	Clackamas County	09/08/2020-10/06/2020
	Chehalem Mountain Bald Peak	09/08/2020-09/15/2020
	Pike Road	09/08/2020-09/14/2020
	Slater Fire	09/09/2020-11/03/2020
	Brattain Fire	09/12/2020-09/29/2020
	0419 Fire	06/29/2021-06/30/2021
	Bootleg Fire	07/10/2021-08/15/2021
Patton Meadow Fire	08/15/2021-08/31/2021	