

TESTIMONY ON LC 164: POLITICAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LIMITS

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to the
Senate Interim Committee on Campaign Finance Reform

January 14, 2020

LC 164 represents some improvements to HB 2714A (2019), particularly on the level of allowed contributions. But it also omits some of the useful provisions in HB 2714A.

My testimony outlines some concerns with LC 164. If those concerns were corrected, I would support LC 164.

Attached are tables showing the contribution limits in LC 164 and those in HB 2714A. The table on HB 2714A is more complete than the table distributed by the sponsors of that bill during the 2019 session, because my table includes all of the allowed sources of contributions, including local candidate committees, Oregon federal candidate committees, and non-Oregon federal candidate committees.

On the whole, the limits proposed in LC 164 are better than those in HB 2714A, because they do not create avenues for unlimited contributions. Attached is my final testimony on HB 2714A (May 24, 2019), indicating how it would allow several such avenues.

Here are my primary concerns with the December 30 draft of LC 164, following by a separate section discussing its approach to small donor committees (SDCs).

1. LC 164 has no overall prohibitory clause, so it would allow the creation of new, uncontrolled entities. LC 164 needs a section that states:

An Individual or Entity may make Contributions only as specifically allowed to be received by this Act.

That is language from the Multnomah County and Portland measures.

LC 164 also needs definitions of "individual" and "entity," which are not defined in current election law.

LC 164 has such prohibitory language but only within specific categories. There is no overall prohibitory clause.

Also, many of the limits in LC 164 are expressed as limits on the receipt of contributions, not limits on the making of contributions. In those cases, persons who make contributions in excess of the receipt limits cannot be penalized, because they have violated no law.

2. LC 164 does not address limits on local government candidates. That was a good feature of HB 2714A, which set limits on all local government candidates equal to those applicable to candidates for the Oregon House of Representatives, with allowance for lower limits adopted by local governments. This is an important feature to restore.
3. LC 164 lumps judges in with partisan candidates. The limits on judges should be separate. Judges should not be getting contributions, much less huge contributions, from political parties or Legislative Caucus Committees.
4. LC 164 does not actually limit the number of Political Party Committees, each of which can make huge contributions to candidate committees. LC 164 makes no reference to county or district or other local Political Party Committees, leaving them apparently with either (1) unlimited authority to make and receive contributions or (2) no authority to make or receive contributions.

The bill should use the language we developed in HB 2714 that sets:

- A. The limits on contributions to any political party as an aggregate limit on what the donor can give to all components of that party, including county, district, and other committees.
 - B. The limits on contributions by any political party as an aggregate limit on what all components of the party can give, including its county, district, and other committees.
5. LC 164 does not actually limit the number of legislative Caucus Committees. On page 13 is this provision:
- (B) A major political party or minor political party may not establish more than one legislative caucus political committee in the Senate and one legislative caucus political committee in the House of Representatives.

That does not preclude the creation of legislative caucus political committees elsewhere. Again, the language in HB 2714A is better.

6. LC 164 fails to enact any limits on candidate self-funding. I recommend this provision, based on the Washington law.

Nothing in this section limits the amount a candidate may contribute from the candidate's personal funds to the principal campaign committee of the candidate, except that the principal campaign committee of a candidate for state office or local office may not accept a contribution from the candidate's personal funds during the period beginning 21 days before the election in excess of \$50,000 for a candidate for statewide office or \$5,000 for any other candidate.

Also, a self-funding candidate should be required to disclose that in her ads. That is what Measure 47 requires:

Once a candidate has contributed more than \$5,000 in the aggregate to the candidate's own committee during any election cycle:

- (1) The candidate committee shall report to the appropriate filing officer pursuant to ORS Chapter 260, within three (3) business days of its receipt, every subsequent contribution by the candidate during the election cycle; and
 - (2) Every paid communication by the candidate committee shall prominently disclose the amount that the candidate has contributed to the candidate's committee during the election cycle.
- 7. LC 164 omits any adjustment for inflation, which the United States Supreme Court says strengthens the constitutionality of contribution limits.
- 8. LC 164 omits the committee reorganization provisions from HB 2714A, which are:
 - (b) The Secretary of State shall reorganize as a multicandidate political committee any active political committee that remains organized to operate as a miscellaneous political committee on March 31, 2021. Any moneys in the bank accounts of a political committee described in this paragraph shall transfer to the newly organized multicandidate political committee and may be used in the same manner as any other moneys contributed to the multicandidate political committee.
 - (c) The Secretary of State shall by rule establish a process that provides a miscellaneous political committee that was reorganized under paragraph (b) of this subsection with a single opportunity to reorganize as a measure political committee. The process shall ensure that any moneys in the bank accounts of a political committee described in this paragraph transfer to the newly organized measure political committee and may be used in the same manner as any other moneys contributed to the measure political committee.

That language needs work, so an existing miscellaneous committee can split its existing funds between a new multi-candidate committee and a new measure committee. We would also need to alter existing law to allow "multi-measure" committees.

9. LC 164 omits the HB 2714A language allowing conversion of existing committees to small donor committees (SDCs), if the existing committee itself has subsisted only on small contributions for the previous 24 months.
10. LC 164 repeals all of Measure 47 but fails to replace in any way its tagline provisions, which are far better than the provisions in the adopted HB 2416. I have previously testify on how those tagline provisions are easily avoidable and do not even apply to candidate campaigns.

Problems with Approach to Small Donor Committees

1. LC 164 allows non-individuals to contribute to small donor committees (SDCs). This defeats my concept of SDCs as grass-roots organizations that aggregate small contributions from individuals only.
2. LC 164 limits any SDC to supporting only one candidate. This will result in th creation of probably several hundred, if not thousands, of SDCs, with the attendant paper work and need to create thousands of new bank accounts. LC 164 also defeats a fundamental purpose of SDCs--to enable individuals with insufficient time to evaluate every candidate to delegate the task of selecting which candidates to support to one or more trusted organization. LC 164 is the rare individual with time to investigate every candidate. Even a well-informed person might prefer to contribute some money to a trusted organization and let its endorsement committee choose which candidates to fund.
3. LC 164 requires every SDC to dissolve at the end of the election cycle or when its candidate "suspends" the campaign. "Suspending" a campaign is not a defined event in Oregon law. Also, LC 164 does not specify where the SDC's remaining money is supposed to go, in case of suspension or dissolution. Also, this means that the multiplicity of new SDCs would need to be created in each election cycle, complete with new bank accounts.
4. LC 164 does not recognize the principle that a political committee with a smaller intake spigot should have a larger outflow spigot.

- A. For example, LC 164 would allow a legislative Caucus Committee to accept up to \$2,000 per year from any individual or candidate committee or multicandidate committee. That is 10 times more than LC 164 would allow an SDC to accept. Nevertheless, LC 164 would allow a legislative Caucus Committee to contribute the same amount to a candidate for the legislature (\$15,000) or to a statewide candidate (\$40,000) as an SDC could contribute.
- B. For example, LC 164 would allow a non-statewide candidate committee to accept up to \$750 per election from any individual or candidate committee or multicandidate committee. That is more than 3 times more than LC 164 would allow an SDC to accept. Why, then, would anyone bother to contribute \$200 to an SDC (particularly one limited to a single candidate) instead of contributing \$750 directly to the candidate? Or why not contribute \$2,000 to a Caucus Committee or Political Party Committee that also supports that candidate (and can contribute to the candidate the same amount that an SDC can)?
- C. For example, LC 164 would allow a statewide candidate committee to accept up to \$2,000 per election from any individual or candidate committee or multicandidate committee. That is 10 times more than LC 164 would allow an SDC to accept. Why, then, would anyone bother to contribute \$200 to an SDC (particularly one limited to a single candidate) instead of contributing \$2,000 directly to the candidate? Or why not contribute \$2,000 to a Caucus Committee or Political Party Committee that also supports that candidate (and can contribute to the candidate the same amount that an SDC can)?

Chart: campaign contribution limits as described in LC0164

DONORS	RECIPIENTS					
	Principal candidate committee (non-statewide*)	Principal candidate committee (statewide**)	State party committee	Legislative caucus committee	Multi-legislative candidate committee	Small donor committee
Individuals	\$750 per election	\$2,000 per election	\$2,000 per year	\$2,000 per year	\$200 per election	\$200 per election
Principal candidate committee (non-statewide*)	\$750 per election	\$2,000 per election	\$2,000 per year	\$2,000 per year	\$200 per election	\$200 per election
Principal candidate committee (statewide**)	\$750 per election	\$2,000 per election	\$2,000 per year	\$2,000 per year	\$200 per election	\$200 per election
State party committee	\$15,000 per election	\$40,000 per election	zero	\$40,000 per year	zero	\$200 per election
Legislative caucus committee	\$15,000 per election	\$40,000 per election	zero	zero	zero	\$200 per election
Multi-legislative candidate committee	\$750 per election	\$2,000 per election	\$2,000 per year	\$2,000 per year	\$200 per election	\$200 per election
Small donor committee	\$15,000 per election	\$40,000 per election	zero	zero	zero	zero

** Statewide principal candidate committee refers to a candidate running for Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, Attorney General or Commissioner of the Bureau of Labor and Industries.

Campaign Finance Reform – Contribution Limits (HB 2714A)

Donors	Recipients					
	Candidate Committee	State Party Committee	Caucus Committee	Recall Committee	Multicandidate Committee	Small Donor Committee
Individual	\$2,800 Statewide \$1,500 Senate \$1,000 House per election	\$5,600 per year	\$2,800 per year	\$2,800 Statewide \$1,500 Senate \$1,000 House per election	\$2,800 per year	\$250 per year
Candidate Committee	\$2,800 Statewide \$1,500 Senate \$1,000 House per election	Unlimited	Unlimited	\$2,800 Statewide \$1,500 Senate \$1,000 House per election	\$2,800 per year	Prohibited
State Party Committee	Unlimited	N/A	Unlimited	Unlimited	\$2,800 per year	Prohibited
Caucus Committee	Unlimited	\$2,800 per year	Unlimited	\$2,800 Statewide \$1,500 Senate \$1,000 House per election	\$2,800 per year	Prohibited
Multicandidate Committee	\$2,800 Statewide \$1,500 Senate \$1,000 House per election	\$2,800 per year	\$2,800 per year	\$2,800 Statewide \$1,500 Senate \$1,000 House per election	\$2,800 per year	Prohibited
Small Donor Committee	Unlimited	Prohibited	Prohibited	Unlimited	Prohibited	Unlimited
Oregon Fed Candidate		Unlimited	Unlimited	Prohibited	Prohibited	Prohibited
Non-Oregon Fed Candidate	Prohibited	Prohibited	Unlimited	Prohibited	Prohibited	Prohibited

COMMENTS ON HB 2714-3 (third revised): CONTRIBUTION LIMITS

Dan Meek
May 24, 2019

These comments are on the version of HB 2714-3 that was distributed on Friday, May 17, as the bill will be further changed according to staff of Rep. Rayfield.

Subjects that appeared in previous versions of my comments but are omitted here have been resolved.

I think all of the proposed limits are still too high (except for the limit on individuals contributing to political parties), but my comments here apply mostly to the structure and language of the proposal.

HB 2714-3: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS

The problem remains that the proposed limits are so high that the result will be a proliferation of committees, because the creation of a committee gives the creator an additional large increment of contribution authority (both in receiving contributions and making them).

Earlier versions have lacked effective limits on the number of these large-inflow/large-outflow committees that can be created: Political Party Committee and Caucus Political Committee. I refer to these as "super-committees."

Limit on Number of Caucus Political Committees (partly solved)

The least limited committees are Caucus Political Committees and State Party Committees, which can accept \$2,800 per year from any individual and any Multicandidate Committee plus unlimited contributions from Candidate Committees, State Party Committees, other Caucus Political Committees, Small Donor Committees (SDCs), and federal candidate committees. Such committees can then spend those funds with virtually no limits (only limits of \$2,800 per year to any Caucus Political Committee, Multicandidate Committee, or Recall Committee).

I do not favor the creation of this sort of super-committee. But if it must exist, it should be limited to as few as possible.

I am told by staff that the HB 2714-3 language will be changed to expressly state that each political party can have only one Caucus Political Committee per chamber in the Oregon Legislature.

Limit on Number of Political Party Committees (solved)

I am told by staff that the HB 2714-3 language will be changed to limit each political party to only one Political Party Committee. That would be a statewide committee. Party subdivisions could create Multicandidate Committees, which have much lower limits on their inflows and outflows of money.

The Federal Candidate Money Loophole (partly solved)

The proposal allows any Caucus Political Committee or Political Party Committee to accept unlimited contributions from federal candidate committees. This huge loophole is not shown on the chart of Contribution Limits distributed with HB 2714-3.

Federal candidate committees (for candidates for Congress or President) obviously collect tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars per election cycle. Under current law, each federal candidate committee can accept contributions, per election (twice per election cycle) of up to \$2,800 from any individual, \$2,000 from any other federal candidate committee, \$5,000 from any multicandidate PAC, \$2,800 from any non-multicandidate PAC, \$5,000 from any state or local political party committee, and \$5,000 from any national party committee.

HB 2714-3 would allow an unlimited amount of these dollars (from an unlimited number of federal candidate committees) to flow into Caucus Political Committees and Political Party Committees, which in turn would be allowed to re-contribute or spend those dollars with virtually no limits (see above).

I am told by staff that the HB 2714-3 language will be changed to limit Political Party Committees and Caucus Political Committees to receiving contributions only from federal candidate committees established by bona fide Oregon candidates for U.S. Congress. This will limit the overall size of the potential

funds flowing through this loophole. I believe the better approach is to close this loophole entirely.

Note also that Oregon law allows federal committees to not report anything to ORESTAR. Federal reporting requirements allow delays in reporting. And, as long as HB 2716 has no drill-down provisions, laundering funds through federal committees will allow Oregon candidates to avoid disclosing in their advertisements the true largest sources of their funds.

Lack of Meaningful Limits on the "Super-Committees" (new discussion)

As noted above, HB 2714-3 allows Caucus Political Committees and State Party Committees to accept unlimited contributions from several sources, including Candidate Committees, other Political Party Committees, other Caucus Political Committees, Small Donor Committees (SDCs), and federal candidate committees. Such committees can then spend those funds with virtually no limits (only limits of \$2,800 per year to any Multicandidate Committee and various limits to Recall Committees from Caucus Political Committees).

This structure would allow a single individual to contribute \$193,000 to a single candidate in a single election cycle, merely by contributing smaller allowed amounts to 5 statewide candidate committees, 15 state Senate candidate committees, and 60 state House candidate committees. Add to that additional money that could be funnelled through federal candidate committees and phony Oregon candidate committees. It takes maybe 5 minutes and no money to create an Oregon candidate committee. C&E Systems will, for a small fee, set up a bank account for it. Under HB 2714-3, each such committee can receive contributions of \$2,800 or \$1,500 or \$1,000 per election and send all of its funds to a Caucus Political Committee or Political Party Committee, which in turn can direct all of those funds to one or more favored candidates.

It would be simple to use this structure to enable any individual to contribute, say, \$400,000 to any candidate, which would qualify as one of the top 15 or so contributions in Oregon history.

Other states limit both the inflow to Political Party Committee and/or outflow from Political Party Committee. Very few states have Caucus Political Committees; states that do restrict either inflow or outflow or both.

Outflow Limits

For example, 11 states allow state political parties to contribute to any candidate only the same as any individual can contribute to that candidate:

Arkansas	Missouri
Georgia	Nevada
Hawaii	New Hampshire
Kansas (in contested primaries)	New Mexico
Maine	West Virginia
Maryland	

These states allow state political parties to contribute to any candidate a multiple of what any individual can contribute to that candidate:

Idaho (2x)
Massachusetts (3x)
Minnesota (10x)
Montana (about 2-3x for legislative candidates)
South Carolina (14x for statewide, 5x for legislative)

These states allow state political parties to contribute to any candidate fixed amounts:

Limits on Contributions by State Party Committees to Candidates				
	Governor	Other Statewide	Senate	House
Alaska	\$100,000		\$15,000	\$10,000
Arizona	\$80,100	\$80,100	\$10,100	\$10,100
Colorado	\$615,075	\$113,905	\$22,125	\$15,975
Connecticut	\$50,000	\$35,000	\$10,000	\$5,000
Delaware	\$75,000	\$25,000	\$5,000	\$3,000
Florida	\$250,000	\$250,000	\$50,000	\$50,000
Michigan	\$136,000	\$136,000	\$20,000	\$10,000
Montana	\$23,850	\$8,600	\$1,400	\$850
Ohio	\$716,720	\$716,720	\$142,963	\$71,164
Oklahoma	\$25,000	\$10,000	\$10,000	\$10,000

Limits on Contributions by State Party Committees to Candidates				
	Governor	Other Statewide	Senate	House
Rhode Island	\$25,000	\$25,000	\$25,000	\$25,000
South Carolina	\$50,000	\$50,000	\$5,000	\$5,000
Tennessee	\$393,800	\$393,800	\$63,000	\$31,600

If we take the 11-state Arkansas-West Virginia approach, the pipe from Caucus Political Committees and Political Party Committees to any candidate committee should be reduced from UNLIMITED to \$2,800 / \$1,500 / \$1,000. The Idaho-Montana approach would double those numbers. The Minnesota approach would increase them by a factor of 10.

Inflow Limits

23-26 states have limits on funds flowing into state political parties from candidate committees. The lowest limit (0 during campaigns) is in place in 11 states. 5 other states have limits of \$5,400 or less.

Limits on Contributions by Candidate Committees to Party Committees		
	During Campaign	After Election
Alabama	5000	5000
Alaska	0	0
Arizona	0	0
Arkansas	0	surplus* only
California	35200	35200
Colorado	575	575
Connecticut	0	0
Delaware	20000	20000
Florida	0	25000 of surplus*
Hawaii	25000	25000
Kansas	15000	15000
Kentucky	0	surplus* only
Louisiana	0	surplus* only

Limits on Contributions by Candidate Committees to Party Committees		
	During Campaign	After Election
Michigan	unclear	unclear
Montana	unclear	unclear
New Hampshire	1000	1000
New Jersey	25000	25000
New Mexico	5400	5400
Ohio	35597	35597
Oklahoma	0	25000 of surplus*
Rhode Island	1000	1000
South Carolina	0	surplus* only
Tennessee	unclear	unclear
Vermont	10000	10000
Washington	0	surplus* only
West Virginia	1000	15000 of surplus*
*Surplus means only funds left over after the election.		

Measure 47 (2016) does not allow any candidate committee money to flow into Political Party Committees. It requires that Political Party Committees obtain their funds from individuals (\$2,000 per year), Small Donor Committees (unlimited), and political committees (\$2,000 per year).

Suggested Limits

I suggest these inflow limits to each Caucus Political Committee and Political Party Committee: contributions per year of \$5,600 from any individual, \$5,600 from any type of Oregon political committee. those limits would be higher than those in place in 16 states.

As noted above, most states also have outflow limits on Political Party Committees.

Allowing Unlimited Use of Personal Funds without Taglines

The proposal expressly allows unlimited use of a candidate's "personal funds." I have previously written about how this is a huge loophole to funnel corporate funds into campaigns. Corporations can award multi-million dollar bonuses to executives who retire and immediately use those funds to run for office (see Pete Ricketts in Nebraska). **At a minimum, candidates using substantial amounts of "personal funds" should be required to disclose that in all of their advertising, including the amount of personal funds so dedicated.** Unfortunately, the most recent version of HB 2716 does not require that.

No Provision about Money Balances held by Existing Committees

Existing committees can have lots of money as of the operative date of the proposal in December 2020. The proposal is silent as to whether these money balances can be retained and used after the operative date, except for SDCs. Say an existing candidate committee of an incumbent holds a balance of \$1 million on that date and that the candidate's opponents in the 2022 elections have no such balance. Those opponents will have to raise all of their funds under the contribution limits, while the incumbent is apparently allowed to spend the \$1 million.

There need to be limits on the money balances that existing committees can carry forward after the operative date and/or a requirement that those funds be donated to Oregon charities.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in *Lair v. Motl*, 873 F3d 1170, 1186, (9th Cir 2017), *cert denied sub nom. Lair v. Mangan*, 139 S Ct 916 (2019), noted that a feature that preserved the validity of Montana's limits on campaign contributions was that "by prohibiting 'incumbents from using excess funds from one campaign in future campaigns,' Montana 'keeps incumbents from building campaign war chests and gaining a fundraising head start over challengers.'"

The \$1,000 Limit on Contributions to All Local Candidates Should be Subject to Local Override only in a Downward Direction

Section 3(1)(b) now states:

- (b) Except as otherwise provided by a local provision or paragraph (c) of this subsection, the limits on aggregate contributions that may be accepted by a candidate or the principal campaign committee of a candidate for the office of state Representative under this section also apply to a candidate or the principal campaign committee of a candidate for any elected office that is not a state office.

That language would allow a local government to override the \$1,000 limit with any limit it wishes or no limit at all. Local governments should be allowed to alter the otherwise applicable limit only in a downward direction. I suggest this revision:

- (b) The limits on aggregate contributions that may be accepted by a candidate or the principal campaign committee of a candidate for the office of state Representative under this section also apply to a candidate or the principal campaign committee of a candidate for any elected office that is not a state office, unless local governments adopt lower limits applicable to such candidate.

Subsection (3)(1)(c) stands by itself. It is not necessary to refer to it in Subsection (3)(1)(b).

HB 2714-3 defines "local provision" by referring to any "provision adopted by a city, county or other local government." But it does not define "local government." I suggest:

"Local government" means the government of any county, city, municipality, regional government, or district.

The Metropolitan Service District ("Metro") is actually a regional government, as are 7 regional councils of governments (COGs).

I am told by staff that LC perceives a problem with the Legislature limiting a local "home rule" government to only lowering the \$1,000 limit and not raising

it. Home rule counties and cities are subject to laws adopted by the Legislature. The Legislature bans them from doing many things, like controlling rents or diesel pollution or adopting higher minimum wages or banning use of GMO seeds. There are dozens of Oregon appellate court decisions so holding.

[A state] statute will displace a local ordinance only "where the text, context, and legislative history of the statute 'unambiguously expresses an intention to preclude local governments from regulating' in the same area as that governed by the statute." **Rogue Valley Sewer Services**, 357 Or. at 450-51, 353 P.3d 581 (quoting **Gunderson, LLC v. City of Portland**, 352 Or. 648, 663, 290 P.3d 803 (2012)).

Nw. Nat. Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or 309, 336, 374 P.3d 829, 845 (2016).

Thus, we begin by examining how state law might preempt a local law enacted pursuant to a city's "home rule" authority. Under that framework, a local law is valid and not preempted if "'it is authorized by the local charter or by a statute,'" and if it does not "'contravene[] state or federal law.'" **Rogue Valley Sewer Services v. City of Phoenix**, 357 Or. 437, 450, 353 P.3d 581 (2015) (quoting **La Grande/Astoria v. PERB**, 281 Or. 137, 142, 576 P.2d 1204, adh'd to on recons.) 284 Or. 173, 586 P.2d 765 (1978).

Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 275 Or App 874, 882, 365 P.3d 1157, 1162, (2015), *review denied*, 360 Or 465 (2016).

Small Donor Contribution Limit Preemption

HB 2714-3 has a new provision in Section 3:

- (1) (c) Notwithstanding any local provision, a candidate for any elected office not listed in this section may accept unlimited contributions from a small donor political committee.

This would preempt the provisions in the Multnomah County and Portland charters that limit "small donor committees" to receiving contributions only from individuals in amounts of \$100 or less per individual per year. This would allow

a state-level SDC, receiving contributions of up to \$250 per individual per year, to make unlimited contributions to candidates in Multnomah County and Portland races, preempting the local provisions.

While the Legislature has the power to override the voters of Multnomah County and Portland, doing so is not a good idea. Anything this language would accomplish could be better achieved with this:

A small donor committee at the state level may create a subaccount to qualify as a small donor committee under a local law. Any lawful contribution received from an individual by the state-level small donor committee may be allocated, in whole or in part, to the subaccount. Such allocation shall not prevent the subaccount from qualifying as a small donor committee under the local law, if each contribution amount allocated to the subaccount would comply with the local law, if it were made by the individual who contributed it to the state-level small donor committee.

The state-level small donor committee shall report, pursuant to ORS 260.057, every such allocation to a subaccount. Each expenditure by a state-level small donor committee reported pursuant to ORS 260.057 shall identify the subaccount, if any, from which it was made.

This would enable state-level SDCs to participate in local elections without overriding the local provisions regarding SDCs.

Need for Severability Clause

The very short severability clause in HB 2714-3 is an improvement. I still recommend the severability clause from Measure 47 (2006).

Need for Legislative Findings

I refer to my May 4 comments on this subject.

Need for Provision Allowing Entities to Create Separate Committees

I refer to my May 4 comments on this subject.