

Senate Bill 492

House Committee on Judiciary May 16, 2013



- "The district attorney shall disclose to a represented defendant the following material and information within the possession or control of the district attorney: . . . "
 - "any material or information"
 - "that tends to"
 - "exculpate the defendant, negate or mitigate the defendant's guilt or punishment"
 - "or impeach a witness the state intends to call at trial."



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"Any material or information . . . "

- Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 481 (9th Cir. 1997 (en banc) (Brady material "need not have been independently admissible.").
- *U.S. v. Rodriguez*, 496 F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The obligation to disclose information covered by the *Brady* and *Giglio* rules exists without regard to whether that information has been recorded in tangible form.").



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"... that *tends* to ..."

- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) ("A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would **tend to** exculpate him or reduce the penalty... does not comport with standards of justice.").
- ORPC 3.8(b) (Prosecutors must produce evidence "that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense.").
- U.S. v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 2013)
 ("The prosecution must disclose materials that are *potentially* exculpatory or impeaching.").



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"... guilt or punishment ..."

- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (government must produce exculpatory information relating "either to guilt or to punishment.").
- U.S. v. Price, 566 F.3d 900, 911-12 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[T]he government should therefore disclose all evidence relating to guilt or punishment which might reasonably be considered favorable to the defendant's case.").



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• *U.S. v. Bagley*, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985) (prosecutor's *Brady* obligations extend not only to exculpatory evidence, but also to "evidence that the defense might have used to *impeach the Government's witnesses*" (citing *Giglio v. U.S.*, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)).



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- *Brady* obligations are *not* limited to information "actually known" by the prosecutor.
- *Kyles v. Whitley*, 514 U.S. 419, 437-38 (1995) ("[T]he individual prosecutor has a *duty to learn* of any favorable evidence *known to the others* acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the *police*.").
- Youngblood v. West Virginia, 547 U.S. 867, 869-70 (2006)
 ("Brady suppression occurs when the government fails to turn over even evidence that is known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutor" (internal quotation omitted)).
- State v. Warren, 304 Or. 428, 433 (1987) ("[T]he prosecutor is responsible for evidence in the possession of the police. . . . even if it was not in the prosecutor's physical possession.").

QUESTIONS?